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Residential Consumer Experience with Electric
Deregulation in the United Kingdom
Executive Summary
The United Kingdom began deregulating its electric market
years before the U.S.  Thus, the UK provides the best
example of what can be expected in the  deregulated
residential retail electric market in the United States.  .
An extensive review of the evidence found:
Questionable  price savings:  Large drops in wholesale
market prices were not fully passed on to residential
consumers in the deregulated marketplace.
Increase in complaints:  The volume of complaints about
energy companies jumped after deregulation, and new types
of complaints such as unauthorized switching of service
(“slamming”) arose.
Failure of Competition to Develop:  Rather than compete for
new  customers,  companies  are  relying on customer
inertia to keep their existing customer base.
Higher prices for low-income consumers:  Since deregulation
begain in 1990, there has been a marked increase in the use
of  prepayment meters, resulting  in low-income customers 
paying  more for their electricity.
These findings lead us to recommend against implementing
plans to replace traditional regulation with “retail competition”
for consumers.  Where a state or country has already
enacted such a plan, it should be prepared to address and
remedy each of the problems identified above.
Background
The last few decades have seen a move towards
the privatization of state owned network utilities
such as telephone, electricity, and  gas.
Globally, markets for these goods have
increasingly been restructured to replace rate
regulation with market price mechanisms.  This
shift towards competitive market structure has
been imported to the United States, where rate
regulated utilities are increasingly “deregulated.”
Ranking with water and natural gas high on a
household’s hierarchy of vital utilities, electricity
provides light, climate control, and appliance
power to families in modern society.  The
importance of electricity has made the
deregulation of its production and sale a
contentious topic.  Before deregulation was
implemented, advocates of restructuring
predicted increased efficiency and lower prices,
while sceptics warned of new risks to consumers
in a deregulated marketplace.
One of the first electricity markets to take the
plunge into deregulation was that of England and
Wales in the United Kingdom.  England and
Wales began the restructuring process in 1990
with the opening of their wholesale market to
competition.
1  Retail markets were  opened up in
stages, immediately beginning with the largest
industrial and commercial users and concluding
with the opening of its residential market in early
Segments of an Electricity Market:
There are four components of a consumer’s electricity
bill:
•   Generation: The production of electricity from fuel
or renewable sources.
•   Transmission: The transport of electricity over long
distances via high voltage wires.
•   Distribution: The final delivery of electricity after it
has been stepped down in substations to household
voltage levels.
•   Retail: Buying electricity from the wholesale
market and reselling it to consumers.  This includes
the administrative overhead of customer care,
billing, and advertising.  In the UK, meter reading is
considered part of the retail segment, but it is
considered a distribution function in the US.
Together, these make up the electricity market. Under
the UK’s monopoly cost structure prior to 1999, each
component contributed to a typical consumer bill
roughly as follows: Generation (63%), transmission
(4%) distribution (27%), and retail (5%).
1  Since
restructuring, generation prices have fallen and retail
prices have increased as a proportion of the bill.
Under most deregulation schemes, transmission and
distribution are maintained as regulated monopolies.
Generation is opened to competition.  Retail supply has
been opened to competition in fewer markets, some of
which have introduced competition only to large
industrial and commercial users.
Notes:
1 OFFER 1997, as reported in Littlechild “Why we need electricity
retailers” August 22 2000, Table 1. Numbers recalculated to exclude
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1999.
2  The pioneering nature of the changes in
the U.K, along with the perceived success of the
reforms meant that the “British model” was often
used as a archetype for redesigns of other
markets, including those in the U.S.
Today, several years into deregulated markets in
England and Wales, we have the experience and
data to evaluate the changes deregulation has
brought to consumers.  Recognizing that
wholesale and retail deregulation are separate
issues (See Box: Segments of an Electricity
Market), this report focuses on evaluating the
impact retail market deregulation has had on
residential consumers.
Now is an important time to evaluate the fruits of
restructuring.  Although several states in the U.S.
have transitioned their electricity markets, others
(such as New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Nevada)
delayed or reversed course after the California
crisis, opting to “wait and see” how things have
developed in other markets.
3  Member states of
the European Union are also looking to learn
from the experience of the early movers, as many
have recently completed the transition to retail
competition and the rest must do so by 2007.
4
The evidence
The evidence we examine falls along four main
themes: customer service, price, market function,
and effect on low-income consumers.  Using
each of these metrics, we compare the outcome
of residential retail competition versus the data
from traditional regulatory structures.
Privatization of the British electricity industry
While outside the UK, the changes that have taken place in the British electricity industry are termed liberalization or
deregulation, in Britain, they are generally described as privatization. This reflects the perception (perhaps mistaken) that
the change from state to private ownership was more important than the concurrent opening of the market to competition.
Some analyst also avoid the term “deregulation” as a misnomer – market price setting mechanisms can require more
regulation than state ownership or rate regulation.
In the United Kingdom, prior to privatization, there were three main electricity transportation grids.  The largest covered
England and Wales (about 90% of demand), while there was a separate but interconnected system covering Scotland and a
physically isolated system supplying Northern Ireland.  All of the segments of the market were state owned.
At the time, there were was one main generation and transmission company and twelve regional distribution and retail
companies in England and Wales. The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) had an effective monopoly of
generation and owned and operated the national high voltage transmission system. In 1990, it was split into four companies.
The fossil fuel plants were given to two newly privatized companies, National Power and Powergen, while the nuclear
plants remained in public ownership in a new company, Nuclear Electric. The transmission network was separated and was
transferred to the new National Grid Company (NGC).
The twelve regional distribution and retail companies (referred to as Regional Electricity Companies, or RECs) were each
privatised intact in 1990. They were required to make an accounting separation between their monopoly distribution and
their increasingly competitive retail activities, and were given joint ownership of NGC. (In 1995, the Regional Electricity
Companies were required to sell their shares in the National Grid Company (NGC) and NGC remains entirely independent.
In 2002, it merged with its equivalent in the gas industry, Transco, to form National Grid Transco.)
In Scotland, there were two publicly owned companies before privatization, the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB)
and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electricity Board (NSHEB). These were fully vertically integrated monopoly companies
carrying out generation, transmission, distribution and retail in their regions. These companies were privatised largely intact
in 1990 as Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro. The nuclear plants could not then be privatised and were placed in a new
publicly owned company, Scottish Nuclear. The connection between England and Scotland was then relatively weak and
although there were provisions for competition, Scotland remained, in practice, two vertically integrated monopolies.  Since
1990, these connections have improved, allowing more interaction between the Scottish and England and Wales markets.
Steve Thomas contributed to this sectionResidential Consumer Experience with Electric Deregulation  in the United Kingdom
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SERVICE
Be careful what you wish for: the market
opens to ‘competitors’
The idea of deregulation had been sold to
policymakers with images of energy companies
beating a path to the doors of consumers,
offering savings and enhanced products.  In the
UK, this quite literally occurred: door-to-door
selling was an early and popular marketing
channel for retail companies looking to sign up
customers.
Door-to-door selling brought with it the first signs
that competition had a down side.  It quickly
became apparent that commission-driven
salespeople were engaging in deceptive and
fraudulent practices in order to make sales.
Allegations of “slamming” (i.e. switching providers
without the consent of the consumer) and other
fraudulent tactics were reported by consumers
and regulators.  Some retailers were also
accused of improperly blocking consumers from
leaving their service.  The UK governmental
agency charged with regulating the new market
(OFGEM), has taken action against multiple
companies for illegal sales tactics since the
market opened.  Recently, for example, OFGEM
fined London Electricity over $3 million for acts of
misrepresentation by its sales staff.
5
Billing complaints have also emerged as a
problem under deregulation.  The government
consumer protection agency Energywatch
estimates that half a million consumers have
been put in debt because of poorly estimated bills
in the last year alone.
6  When companies
underestimate meter readings, consumers can be
surprised by large bills when the meter is
physically checked.  If a household is on a tight
budget, this unexpected bill can snowball into a
larger debt.  Energywatch recently launched a
“better billing campaign.”
Overall complaints to Energywatch rose by nearly
400% over the first year of retail competition,
from 6,000 complaints the 12 months before Feb
1999 to 22,000 complaints the following year.
7
By the 2002-2003 financial year, Energywatch
reported receiving 92,600 complaints from





Proponents of deregulation promised that
privatizing and opening the electricity markets to
competition would squeeze out inefficiencies,
resulting in lower prices to consumers.  Using this
yardstick, how have customers fared in the new
marketplace?
From 1990 to 2002, U.K. standard credit
residential prices have fallen about 30% in real
terms.
9 Since 1998 (the eve of opening the
residential market), prices have fallen about 17%
in real terms.  These gains are used as a basis to
declare competition a “success” – after all, the
Consumer Voices
"Electricity Direct lied to me, manipulated me, misled me, ignored me and generally
abused me.  This is the most appalling and underhand service I have ever experienced."
David Patterson, Hotel Owner in New Galloway, via Energywatch ‘better billing webpage
(http://www.energywatch.org.uk/betterbilling/index.asp)
“It's a pain. It might only take 'three minutes' to complete the form, as was quoted by the
regulator on the radio this morning, but it takes three years to sort out the mess
afterwards. Having swapped my Electricity supply to British Gas they still haven't billed
me 14 months later. Somehow I suspect a rather large bill will land on my doorstep one
day.”
Dave Gibson, England via BBC news website. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3014187.stm)Residential Consumer Experience with Electric Deregulation  in the United Kingdom
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average monthly bills are lower for U.K.
consumers after retail competition then before.
However, a true analysis of costs to consumer
requires looking at what residential prices would
have done without retail competition.  This
requires a closer look at wholesale and
distribution prices, as well as pricing trends for
other classes of consumers.
Under the “deregulated” system in the UK, the
transmission and distribution systems remained
monopolies subject to rates set by the
government.  Mandated reductions in the rates of
these systems (which represent about 30% of a
consumer’s bill) reduced bills by about 9%.
These price changes would have happened
regardless of retail competition.
More significantly, OFGEM (the UK regulator)
reports wholesale prices are down 40% since
1998.  This drop has been attributed to a
redesign of the wholesale market, over capacity,
and lower fuel costs.
10  Since wholesale prices
represented about 50% of a consumer’s bill in
1998, this should have translated to large gains
for consumers independent of changes to the
retail market.
Significant price reductions have been seen by
large commercial and industrial customers.
Commercial and industrial uses have been able
to use volume contracts and aggressive
negotiating to capture the benefits of dropping
wholesale prices.  Data from the UK’s
Department of Trade and Industry shows that
from 1990 to 2002, prices fell 39% in real terms
for industrial customers.
11  From 1998 to 2002,
prices fell 20%.  These customers already had
retail competition, so this 20% drop is also
independent of the introduction of residential
retail competition.  Residential consumers have
seen less of the wholesale price reductions from
1998 to 2002 than industrial customers.
The retail electric markets opened for industrial
and commercial customers first, from 1990 to
1998.  During this time, it appears that retail
companies allocated their higher cost contracts
to the captive residential market and their lower
cost contracts to favored commercial and
A Fair Wind for Liberalization
The true test of electricity market reforms is whether prices
are lower than they would have been if the reforms had not
taken.  Thus, although prices have fallen since 1990, we
need to take into account the very favourable circumstances
That influenced prices  over the last 13 years.
Costs fell prior to privatization.  The first element to take
into account is that the much maligned publicly owned
companies were consistently increasing their efficiency
before privatisation by about 1-2% per year and there is no
reason to assume this would not have continued. So in the
thirteen years since privatisation, costs under their control
(e.g., excluding fuel purchase) might have fallen by up to
30%, perhaps reducing overall costs by 5% or more.
Government also imposed real price increases prior to
privatisation in 1987 and 1988 totalling 7% to ‘fatten’ the
companies up for privatisation.
Fuel costs dropped since privatization.  Prices for coal and
gas, the two major generation fuels in Britain, have fallen in
real (net of inflation) terms since 1990 by about 40% and
that alone should have resulted in overall real price
reductions of about 10%. Coal and gas prices are set in
regional and global markets and liberalisation in Britain
cannot claim any credit for these price reductions, they were
simply ‘good luck’.  Recently, this luck has ended, with
British gas announcing a 6% bump on consumer prices for
2004, following increases by Powergen as well.
1
Capital subsidies.  In addition, because the state owned
infrastructure and generation plants were sold in
privatization for only about a third of their asset value, the
new companies received a large windfall that has reduced
their costs. In the monopoly businesses, (transmission and
distribution, about 30% of total costs), prices are set to give
a ‘fair’ rate of return on the assets owned. Effectively
writing off two thirds of the asset bases has allowed price
reductions of nearly 50%. These price reductions had little
to do with efficiency gains, rather they were paid for by
taxpayers who saw the assets they owned sold off at fire-
sale prices.  These price reductions are also temporary –
prices will have to rise to when the discounted assets age
and are replaced by new assets purchased at full market
value.
To put it simply, if fossil fuel prices had not fallen and the
assets had not been sold off at a fraction of their value, it is
far from clear whether prices would have fallen, and even
more unlikely that prices would have been lower than if the
reforms had not taken place.
1 "British Gas puts up energy prices" 8 December, 2003.  BBC News
Online.
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industrial accounts.
12  This resulted in a higher
spread between the two customer types in 1998
then at the market opening in 1990.  Retail
competition was proposed to reduce this spread
in costs, but the data shows that instead the
spread between the prices paid per kilowatt hour
by the different customer types has widened even
further.
In 1998 residential consumers paid about 220%
more per kilowatt hour than industrial consumers,
but by 2002, the spread in prices had risen so
that residential consumers paid over two and half
times the prices paid by industrial consumers.
(see chart: Residential Retail Prices for Electricity
as a Percentage of Prices Paid by Industrial
Users). 
Thus, the gains to consumers since 1998 can
largely be attributable to influences in the
marketplace other than retail competition.  In fact,
the cost of the retail component of a consumer’s
bill has risen.  A report from the UK’s National
Audit Office in 2003 indicated that retail costs
have increased 20-40% due to the requirements
of the competitive market structures. Residential
consumers’ bills are further impacted by retail
company profits that are above historical levels.
13
MARKET PERFORMANCE
Competition is “in danger of failing”
It is hard to judge the market a
competitive success benefiting
consumers, as  complaints have
increased and the prices paid by
residential retail electricity
customers have not fallen.  Lately
advocates of deregulation have
focused on competition as an end in
itself rather then a means to
delivering services more efficiently.
Those who support deregulation
have often in the past pointed to the
UK as a model because of its
relatively high rates of “switching” –
43% of electricity customers have
switched suppliers at least once.
14
High rates of switching have been
viewed as an indication that competitive forces
are operating in the marketplace.
Recently, however, even this yardstick of success
has been called into question in the UK.
Switching rates jumped quickly after the market
opened in 1999, but since 2001 the percentage of
consumers to ever switch has inched up just 5%,
revealing that the majority of consumers have no
inclination to switch providers.  These statistics
led the government funded industry watchdog
Energywatch to warn in June of 2003 that
competition was “in danger of failing.”
15
Another metric of competition, the number of
active market participants, has also declined
since the initial opening of the market..  The
Retail Electricity Companies in Scotland and
England and Wales
1990  2002
1. London                    1. EDF. Owns:
2. SEEBOARD               London, SEEBOARD, SWEB 
3. SWEB                     2. Powergen (E.ON). Owns:
4. Eastern                        Eastern, East Midlands, Norweb
5. East Midlands         3. Innogy (RWE). Owns:
6. Norweb                        Yorkshire, Midlands, Northern
7. Yorkshire              4. Scottish Power.  Owns:
8. Midlands                      South Scotland, Manweb
9. Northern               5. Scottish & Southern.  Owns:
10. South Scotland           North Scotlans, Southern, 
11. Manweb                     SWALEC 
12. North Scotland    6. British Gas (Centrica)
13. SWALEC










1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Residential Retail Prices for Electricity 
as a Percentage of Prices Paid by Industrial Users
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market opened with the original 14 incumbent
retailers.  Today, after a wave of mergers and
acquisitions, 6 major players account for over
99% of the market.  (See table Retail
Electricity Companies in Scotland and
England and Wales, and Box Market
consolidation since 1990)
This has resulted in a reduction of the
number of competitive offers made to
consumers.  All major companies remaining
are vertically integrated, owning both
generation and retail capabilities.  Market
observers fear this acts as a barrier to the
entry of new participants, since a new retail
company would have to either build new
generation or find a company willing to sell
electricity to a competitor of its retail unit.
All of the major retail companies that remain
appear to have turned their backs on
aggressively competing for new residential
customers in favor of consolidating their
market base.
16  In the summer of 2003, the
French company EDF announced it was firing
its UK sales force and giving up on gaining
new customers in the market.  EDF’s action
followed an announcement from British Gas
that it was cutting its door-to-door retail force
in half, and reports that both Scottish and
Southern and Scottish Power were reducing
their customer acquisition strategies.
17
Reduction in sales staff is a signal that price
competition for residential customers is over.
UK retailers spend on the order of $80 to
acquire a customer through marketing.  The
current rollback in marketing comes as they
realize that it is very difficult to keep a
customer who has demonstrated a
willingness to switch long enough to recoup
this marketing investment.
18  In fact, an
aggressive residential consumer in the
Eastern region willing to spend the time and
energy to continually monitoring prices would
have had to  switch at least twice in the last
two years to maintain the best price.
19
Levelling off of gross switching rates
indicates that most consumers aren’t willing
to spend the time searching for marginal
gains.
Market consolidation since 1990
The market structure set up in 1990 remained unchanged until 1995,
largely because of restrictions against takeovers implemented by the UK
government during privatization.
Restrictions against takeovers of the Retail Electricity Companies
(RECs) expired in 1995, and was immediately followed by a period of
intense mergers and acquisitions activity – 11 out of the 12 RECs
changed ownership in the following two years.  Seven were bought by
US utilities. However, attempts by the generating companies National
Power and Powergen to integrate vertically by taking over RECs were
blocked by the government on the grounds that it would hamper
competition.
In 1998, as retail competition for residential consumers was being
introduced, the UK governmental regulator began to require a much
more complete separation of RECs’ regulated distribution businesses
and the soon-to-be competitive retail businesses.  This separation was
intended to prevent the monopoly activities from cross-subsidising the
competitive activities.  In 1998, the policy on vertical integration was
reversed and National Power and Powergen were allowed to take over
retail businesses. The separation of supply from distribution, the
opening of the retail market and tougher regulation of monopoly prices
gave incentive for the companies that had purchased  RECs in the 1995-
97 wave to sell them, and most of the US companies exited the market.
Today, 99% of the residential market is controlled by companies that
own generation. The retail businesses were quickly taken over by
generation companies and by 2002, all 12 England & Wales RECs and
the two Scottish retail businesses had been taken over by just five
companies. National Power, which was taken over by the German
company RWE in 2002, owns incumbents in three regions; Powergen,
(taken over by another German utility, E.ON in 2002), owns three
incumbents; EDF, the French national electric utility, owns three
incumbents, Scottish Hydro merged with a REC to form Scottish and
Southern and owns the incumbents in three regions, Scottish Power took
over a REC and owns two regions. Texas based TXU, which seemed to
be in a strong position, owning generation and two large regional supply
businesses, made errors in its wholesale power purchasing and was
forced to sell its business to E.ON in 2002. Increasingly the distribution
and retail supply businesses for a given region are now under separate
ownership.
Vertical integration of generation and supply seems to be forcing
independent generators out of business, and the five main generation
companies without retail supply businesses are all bankrupt or near
bankrupt. It now seems difficult for new generators to enter the market
because the retail supply companies can all supply their needs from their
own plants, while the integrated companies would have no incentive to
sell wholesale power to potential new retail supply companies. The
exception to this is Centrica, which trades in Britain as British Gas.
Building on this powerful brand name, it has won more than 30% of the
residential electricity market despite being one of the most expensive
suppliers in the market. It too has bought generation and now owns over
2000MW of power plant.
Steve Thomas contributed to this sectionResidential Consumer Experience with Electric Deregulation  in the United Kingdom
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Customers who have never switched from their
incumbent provider command a premium when
they are acquired through company acquisitions











switching customers will provide high enough
profit margins to earn back the investment.
They are likely correct, as incumbents still benefit
from significant market power in their home
markets, charging rates $23-40 higher in their
home markets.
21  This premium reflects both the
inertia of consumers and consumers’ view that
the incumbent provider offers them a lower risk
transaction than new entrants.
Incumbent market power has meant that the
competitive market has not helped all consumers
equally – a dual pricing structure has emerged,
low prices for those with a propensity to switch,
and higher prices for the rest of consumers.  This
has raised concerns – albeit
different ones- from both
government and industry.  As
EDF Chief executive Vincent
de Rivas announced the recent
reductions in his sales staff, he
commented that the lower
prices for switchers were
unsustainable: 'If everybody
switched and got a 20 per cent
cut in bills there would be no
suppliers because there would
be no margin,'
22 In contrast,
Energy minister Brian Wilson
recently lamented the high
prices of incumbents, stating
“The benefits of price falls must
not be restricted to those who
switch, not least because if
everyone starts to switch, the
costs of administering this will
outstrip the savings.”  Such
commentary by a high level minister has fuelled
speculation in the trade press that the








The dual pricing structure means that non-
incumbents face high acquisition costs and low
margins.  Marketing costs for acquiring
consumers are difficult to cover on electricity
sales alone,
24 forcing retail electricity companies
to re-fashion themselves as consumer goods and
services suppliers in a vain attempt at larger
margins.  Retail companies now internally
position residential electricity contracts as a
marketing channel for the host of other products
they wish to sell to their customers.
Other utilities, such as gas and
telecommunication services have been a natural
fit.  All the major retail companies offer “dual fuel”
deals- offering to supply consumers with both
their gas and their electricity needs.  Dual fuel
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Competitive Offers for Consumers in 
the Eastern Region





“Whatever you’re planning, npower has a personal loans
service, provided by The Funding Corporation, where you
can borrow from £500 up to £25,000 to spend on virtually
anything.”
Npower website: http://www.npower.com/html/personalloans_5059.htmResidential Consumer Experience with Electric Deregulation  in the United Kingdom
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to switch away for a better price, because they
have both contracts with the same supplier.
Many retail electricity companies offer non-utility
products as well.  Some examples:
•  Southern Electric sells appliances
ranging from dishwashers to DVD
players.
25
•   Npower pitches travel insurance and
personal loans.
•   Centrica (Under the British Gas brand
name) markets home repair services,
burglar alarms, roadside assistance,
and a credit card.
Consumers should be wary of this cross-
marketing, because although bundling goods
may be convenient, they often are not the best
deal.  For example, for an average volume
residential consumer paying by standard credit in
the eastern region, the best dual fuel offer is $55
per year more than choosing the best of each gas
and electricity provider separately.
Fuel Poverty
Low-income consumers are at particular risk when energy prices rise.  When energy prices are high, higher income consumers can
afford investments in insulation and energy efficiency to reduce energy dependence, as well as reduce non-essential usage.   Low-
income consumers, on the other hand, are less likely to be able to come up with the upfront money required for investment in
energy efficiency, even if the investment will quickly pay itself back in savings.  Opportunities to reduce non-essential usage may
also be reduced, as energy usage by low-income consumers is lower than by the population at large, reflecting the fact many have
already cut non-essential usages to a minimum.
1
Vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, can face serious health risks from heat or cold related illnesses if they can not afford to
maintain their house at comfortable temperatures.  More than 400 Americans die from heat related illnesses every year, while the
Center for Disease Control estimates over 700 die from extreme cold.
2
Governmental and non-governmental poverty advocates in the United Kingdom have developed a systematic approach to
identifying low-income households that are at particular need of energy assistance.  They have developed the concept of “fuel
poverty.” The most widely accepted definition of a fuel poor household is one which needs to spend more than 10 per cent of its
income on all fuel use, including that needed to heat its home to an adequate standard of warmth. This is generally defined as 21°C
(70° F) in the living room and 18°C (64° F) in the other occupied rooms.
3  The climate in the UK does not lend itself to concern
about cooling system to prevent heat related illnesses, and the definition includes all fuels (i.e. gas, oil and electricity.)  The UK
uses this definition to target its energy assistance funds to those in the greatest need.  In 1998, about 16% of England’s households
were classified as fuel poor.
4
Recognizing the dangers of fuel poverty, the UK government has launched a campaign to eradicate fuel poverty among vulnerable
groups by 2010.  Fuel poverty is caused by a combination of fuel costs, household income, and household energy efficiency.  The
campaign aims to combat fuel poverty through a mixture of government programs –ranging from efficiency measures to direct
benefits – targeted at the energy poor.
Notes:
1 Oppenheim, Jerrold. “Assuring Electricity Service for all Residential Customers After Electricity Industry Restructuing. November 10, 2001. Pg 23
2 Eric Klinenberg, “Dead Heat” Slate Magazine July 2002; Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, CDC December 20, 1996 / 45(50);1093-1095 Internet Source:
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00044869.htm
3 http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/consumers/fuel_poverty/index.shtml
4 DTI, “The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy” November 2001  Table 4.3 pg 33.Residential Consumer Experience with Electric Deregulation  in the United Kingdom
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Low income consumers
Cross-selling may be annoying for
middle and upper income
consumers who have to deal with
ads in their bills and sales pitches
on their service calls, but the
evolution of electricity as a
marketing channel rather than a
stand alone product has had a
disturbing impact on the prices and
service offered to low income
consumers.
Low-income consumers are an
important bellwether of the success
or failure of market restructuring,
and have been a high-profile part of
the debate leading up to
liberalization.  Advocates for low-
income consumers have been
some of the most vocal participants
in the deregulation debate.  The
stakes are very high for this
segment of the population – even
small increases in electricity costs
can force low-income consumers to
choose between power and other
necessities such as food, rent, and
healthcare (see sidebar – fuel
poverty).
Both the United States and the
United Kingdom have an important
tradition of universal service and
non-discriminatory pricing for
utilities.   This means that citizens
expect all consumers to have
access to electricity and to pay a
fair price for that service.  This
policy goal was generally
accomplished under the previous
market structure through standard
pricing and universal service
obligations for regulated retailers.
 Today, however, retailers segment
the industry and offer the best deals
to the customers they view offering
the highest potential profits across
Prepayment Meters.
Prepayment meters are a type of utility meter that automatically shuts off service
when the pre-paid value of service is exhausted.  The use of this technology has
increased significantly in the United Kingdom since deregulation began. (See chart:
Electricity Customers in Great Britain on Pre-payment Meters)
Implementations of the technology generally involve a consumer buying a set value
of electricity (ranging from a few days to a few months supply) from a retail
distributor.  The consumer is then either given a smart chip key to physically enter
into the meter, or a numerical code to enter into a keypad.  The meter then allows
electricity to flow until the money runs out or it is recharged.
The technology was first introduced in the gas market.  In the years following the
1986 privatisation of the gas market in the U.K, disconnection for non-payment of
bills became a politically charged topic.  In response to a trend of increasing
disconnections, the privatized gas company (British Gas) increased the use of pre-
payment meters to avoid the negative publicity associated with high disconnection
rates.
Consumer advocates in the UK have pointed out, however, that use of prepayment
meters does not block the health and safety hazards associated with disconnection,
but rather hides the rate of disconnections because consumers who can not pay their
bills now “self-disconnect.”  Pre-payment meters effectively bypass the procedural
protections against disconnection.
In 1991, 48,000 residential customers were disconnected for debt.  By1998 this had
dropped to 400, as pre-payment meters replaced disconnection.  However, a report
published by the Energy Association (a trade group) in 2001 found that 24% of
prepayment meter users self-disconnect in a given year, 11% of users for more then
7 hours.
1  With 3.8 million electricity pre-payment meters in place, that translates
to 912,000 customers being disconnected. (410,000 for over 7 hours).  The survey
found that about 1% of consumers were chronically disconnected (over 20 times in
a year).  This translates to about 36,500 consumers.  In sum, the use of pre-payment
meters has dramatically increased the number of short term disconnections.
One of the most troubling aspects of prepayment meters, however, is that that
companies in the UK invariably charge more for the service then they charge
standard credit users. (See main text).  Some utilities justify this on the basis of cost
– consultants hired by the UK regulator estimated prepayment meters cost about
$21-23 per year more then conventional metering technology.
2  However,
promotional literature for metering companies boasts that that the meters can
recoup their costs in reduced debt recovery costs.
3
This technology has been slow to enter the U.S, but utilities have seen deregulation
as an entry point for its use.
4  Several pilot programs have been run in both the
electricity and gas markets.
5  Advocates and consumer need to be aware of this
technology and its effects on consumer well-being.
Notes:
1 Energy Association “Affording Gas and Electricity: Self Disconnection and Rationing by Prepayment
and Low Income Credit Consumers and Company Attitudes to Social Action” March 2001 pg 22-23
2 OFGEM “Prepayment Meters: A Consultation Document” October 1999 pg 35
3 http://www.metering.com/archive/992/30_1.htm
4 NY Gas “Feasibility Study of Pay-for-Use Metering.” NYGAS technology brief. Jan 1999 Internet
Source: www.nygas.org/publications/Zgas715.pdf
5 Howat, John G “Prepayment Meters: Wave of the Future for Low-Income Utility Ratepayers?” August
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all product lines.  Low-income customers, who
are viewed as less likely to buy other goods and
therefore less desirable customers, find
themselves subject to lower levels of competition
in the marketplace – in some cases blatantly
unwanted by companies.
Payment type has become
an easy method for
companies looking to
segment the market.  While
monthly credit billing is the
norm in the United States,
in the U.K, consumers
have traditionally paid
quarterly “in arrears, ”
which is similar to monthly
credit billing in the U.S.




prepayment meters.  (See
sidebar:  Prepayment
meters).   The use of pre-
payment meters expanded
in the electricity market
after its privatization.
Modern banking has also introduced “direct debit”
as a third payment option. Under direct debit the
utility makes a fixed monthly withdrawal from the
consumer’s bank account based on estimated
usage.
A household’s payment
choice is roughly associated
with its income.
26  Households
with low incomes, no bank
account, or a history of
payment problems are more
likely to use a pre-payment
meter.  Consumers who carry
a predictable bank balance
are more likely to choose
direct debit. The most
desirable consumers (i.e.
those paying by direct debit)
are therefore offered the best
prices, while those that pay by
pre-payment meter pay more.
Prepayment meter users pay
on average a $46 a year premium over direct
debit users.
27
The data shows many UK energy companies
have clearly made the decision not to compete
for low-income customers.  For example, in
London, only three companies have chosen to
offer competitive prices for pre-payment meter
customers, as contrasted to eight companies
offering lower rates than the incumbent for direct
deposit and standard credit customers. (see the
table, as well as chart above for comparable data
for the Eastern region).  One company, Npower,
Electricity Customers in Great Britain on Pre-payment 
Meters
Source: Boardman and Fawcett "Competition for the Poor" March 2002 









1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
The Options Facing a Typical Consumer in London







Not Moving (London Electricity) $400 $413 $421
Best Offer (Basic Power) $340 $360 $380
Worst Offer (Various) $400 $413 $472
Number of Better Offers 13 13 5
Max. saving upon switch to better offer $59 $53 $41
Average saving upon switch to better offer $36 $23 $21
Source: Energywatch June 2003.  Table based on 3,300 kWh usage by a
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has offered pre-payment meter customers a rate
of $472, a full $51 higher than the incumbent’s
pre-payment rate, and a clear signal that they do
not want to gain pre-payment customers.  This
reduced competition, as well as lower savings
available for switching, has in turn led to lower
switching rates for low income consumers.
Furthermore,  there are signs that basic
standards of customer service for low income
consumers may be at risk.  Consultants swarm
around the industry, selling the secret to
“increasing revenue through varying customer
services according to target potential”
28 and
describing how to stratify customers according to
value.  Some consultants ask companies to
seriously consider whether they should target and
keep all customers.
29 This raises the very real
spectre of companies offering reduced customer
service levels to customers they don’t predict will
buy higher margin non-utility goods or services.
The reduced competition for and higher prices
paid by low-income consumers should be of
particular concern to consumers and
policymakers.  Retail competition appears to
have given the benefits of declining wholesale
and transmission prices to the players with the
most market power – industrial, commercial, and
upscale consumers.   Although all classes of
consumers are buying the exact same electrons,
they pay strikingly different prices – and more so
today than before restructuring.
Conclusion
The experience of residential consumers in the
UK calls into question the benefits of deregulating
retail electric service, especially for residential
customers.  By any yardstick – service, price,
equity, even competition itself – the deregulation
of residential retail service appears to have had
no benefits for consumers.  The head of OFGEM,
(the UK electricity regulatory agency) has
defended lags in benefits for residential
consumers by claiming that the “market is not yet
mature,”
 30 but after over 4 years of retail
competition, the trends don’t look to be
improving.
Even the industry finds itself questioning the
value of deregulating the retail market.  A 2002
global survey of executives at utility companies
by a consulting firm found “significant levels of
doubt as to whether the benefits of residential
retail competition outweighs the cost.”
31  T h e
same survey found that less then half of
respondents thought the current or planned
residential retail competition schemes in the
United States were effective.
Whatever the “free-market” political appeal of
retail electricity deregulation, the data indicates
that consumers are better off without it.  The
small value of the retail component of the bill,
combined with high marketing and consumer
acquisition costs, works against the ability of
competitive forces to best serve consumers in
this market.
Recommendations
Based on the experience to date in the England
and Wales market, we make the following
recommendations for states and countries
looking to follow in their footsteps.
Reject residential retail electricity market
deregulation: In the UK the promise of
competition and resulting improvements in
service and decreases in price has not been
kept.  Restructured markets have not resulted
in price savings for consumers.  Although the
UK can claim large drops in wholesale market
prices,  those  decreases  have  not  been 
passed on to residential customers in terms of
price savings. In addition, the marketing and
infrastructure costs of competition outweigh
efficiency gains on the thin retail component.
Consumer complaints about fraud, abuse and
billing errors have skyrocketed, along with
prepayment meters that enable price
discrimination against lower income
consumers. Consumers are better served by
keeping retail supply under rate regulation
with distribution and transmission networks.
Do not partially open markets: Pressure
from large industrial and commercial
consumers to open their retail markets can
lead to dangers for residential consumers,
even if the residential market remainsResidential Consumer Experience with Electric Deregulation  in the United Kingdom
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regulated. .  If a partial opening is adopted,
retail companies should not be allowed to
allocate high cost generation contracts to
residential consumers and low cost contracts
to commercial and industrial users, as
happened in the UK.
Increase Consumer Protection in those
markets already deregulated.
•  Enact consumer safeguards on “door to
door” and commission sales:  After retail
competition is implemented, expect problems
at the point of sale.  Experience in the UK (as
well as a similar experience in the state of
Texas) indicates this problem is in inherent an
inadequately regulated system of commission
sales. Rules regarding conduct, disclosure
and consumer remedies must be established
beforehand to  head off problems of fraud and
abuse  before they occur.  .
•   Protect low-income consumers: If retail
competition is implemented, protections need
to be built into the market structure to ensure
that low-income and other vulnerable
consumers have access to the market at fair
and non-discriminatory prices.  Provisions
have to be made to supply (at a fair price) the
consumers that no-one else wants
•   Beware prepayment meters: Experience
in the UK indicates that pre-payment meter
technology can be used to charge higher
prices to lower income consumers and to hide
high disconnection rates.  Private companies
wish to avoid the bad publicity of high direct
disconnection rates and will push for the
introduction of the technology.  However, pre-
payment meter technology merely distances
the company from the problem and doesn’t
solve the policy problem of consumers
without power.  Data indicates that use of the
technology significantly increase the
percentage of consumers that have short
term disconnections.  UK customers on pre-
payment meters have also paid higher prices
then those paying by other means.
•   The degree of price deregulation must
be appropriate to  the level of competition in
the market. The experience in the UK shows
that residential customers did not share in
overall price decreases after deregulation.
Moreover, consolidation in the retail market
has shrunk the number of competitive
suppliers from 14 to 6, with several of those
have announced cutbacks in marketing to
new residential customers.  Clearly,
responsible regulators cannot rely on the so-
called “market” to ensure reasonable prices to
consumers under these circumstances.
Endnotes:
Currency Note: All prices converted to dollars using
the 7/11/03 exchange rate (1£ = $1.631) as published
in the Financial Times on 7/14/03.
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